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Independent but Not Indifferent: Partisan Bias in Monetary Policy at the Fed
dc.contributor.authorClark, William Robertsen_US
dc.contributor.authorArel‐bundock, Vincenten_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-12T19:00:28Z
dc.date.available2014-05-01T14:28:19Zen_US
dc.date.issued2013-03en_US
dc.identifier.citationClark, William Roberts; Arel‐bundock, Vincent (2013). "Independent but Not Indifferent: Partisan Bias in Monetary Policy at the Fed." Economics & Politics (1): 1-26. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/96265>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0954-1985en_US
dc.identifier.issn1468-0343en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/96265
dc.publisherUniversity of Washingtonen_US
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.titleIndependent but Not Indifferent: Partisan Bias in Monetary Policy at the Feden_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelGovernment, Politics and Lawen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/96265/1/ecpo12006.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/96265/2/ecpo12006-sup-0001-AppendixS1-S13.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/ecpo.12006en_US
dc.identifier.sourceEconomics & Politicsen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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