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Prisoner'S Dilemma And The Pigeon: Control By Immediate Consequences
dc.contributor.authorGreen, Leonarden_US
dc.contributor.authorPrice, Paul C.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHamburger, Merle E.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-05T18:18:05Z
dc.date.available2013-03-05T18:18:05Z
dc.date.issued1995-07en_US
dc.identifier.citationGreen, Leonard; Price, Paul C.; Hamburger, Merle E. (1995). "Prisoner'S Dilemma And The Pigeon: Control By Immediate Consequences." Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 64(1). <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/96758>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-5002en_US
dc.identifier.issn1938-3711en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/96758
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_US
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.subject.otherCooperationen_US
dc.subject.otherPrisoner's Dilemmaen_US
dc.subject.otherPigeonsen_US
dc.subject.otherKey Pecken_US
dc.subject.other2 × 2 Gamesen_US
dc.subject.otherTit for Taten_US
dc.subject.otherSelf‐Controlen_US
dc.titlePrisoner'S Dilemma And The Pigeon: Control By Immediate Consequencesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPsychologyen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumWASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, AND STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANYen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/96758/1/jeab.1995.64-1.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1901/jeab.1995.64-1en_US
dc.identifier.sourceJournal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavioren_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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