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Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?
dc.contributor.authorKrupka, Erin L.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWeber, Roberto A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-18T18:32:55Z
dc.date.available2014-08-01T19:11:33Zen_US
dc.date.issued2013-06en_US
dc.identifier.citationKrupka, Erin L.; Weber, Roberto A. (2013). "Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?." Journal of the European Economic Association 11(3): 495-524. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/98296>en_US
dc.identifier.issn1542-4766en_US
dc.identifier.issn1542-4774en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/98296
dc.description.abstractWe introduce an incentivized elicitation method for identifying social norms that uses simple coordination games. We demonstrate that concern for the norms we elicit and for money predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game, including data from a novel experiment and from prior published laboratory studies, that are unaccounted for by most current theories of social preferences. Moreover, we find that the importance of social norm compliance and of monetary considerations is fairly constant across different experiments. This consistency allows prediction of treatment effects across experiments, and implies that subjects have a generally stable willingness to sacrifice money to take behaviors that are socially appropriate.en_US
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.publisherPrinceton University Pressen_US
dc.subject.otherC91en_US
dc.subject.otherC72en_US
dc.subject.otherD64)en_US
dc.titleIdentifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/98296/1/jeea12006.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jeea.12006en_US
dc.identifier.sourceJournal of the European Economic Associationen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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