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Optimal Uniform Pricing Strategy of a Service Firm When Facing Two Classes of Customers

dc.contributor.authorZhou, Wenhuien_US
dc.contributor.authorChao, Xiulien_US
dc.contributor.authorGong, Xitingen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-23T15:59:03Z
dc.date.available2015-06-01T15:48:45Zen_US
dc.date.issued2014-04en_US
dc.identifier.citationZhou, Wenhui; Chao, Xiuli; Gong, Xiting (2014). "Optimal Uniform Pricing Strategy of a Service Firm When Facing Two Classes of Customers." Production and Operations Management 23(4): 676-688.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1059-1478en_US
dc.identifier.issn1937-5956en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/106838
dc.publisherKluwer Publishingen_US
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.subject.otherOptimal Pricingen_US
dc.subject.otherDelay‐Sensitive Customersen_US
dc.subject.otherQueueing Delaysen_US
dc.subject.otherService Systemen_US
dc.titleOptimal Uniform Pricing Strategy of a Service Firm When Facing Two Classes of Customersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelIndustrial and Operations Engineeringen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelEngineeringen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/106838/1/poms12171.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/106838/2/poms12171-sup-0001-Onlinesupplement.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/poms.12171en_US
dc.identifier.sourceProduction and Operations Managementen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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