Optimal Uniform Pricing Strategy of a Service Firm When Facing Two Classes of Customers
dc.contributor.author | Zhou, Wenhui | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Chao, Xiuli | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Gong, Xiting | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-05-23T15:59:03Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-06-01T15:48:45Z | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2014-04 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Zhou, Wenhui; Chao, Xiuli; Gong, Xiting (2014). "Optimal Uniform Pricing Strategy of a Service Firm When Facing Two Classes of Customers." Production and Operations Management 23(4): 676-688. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1059-1478 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1937-5956 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/106838 | |
dc.publisher | Kluwer Publishing | en_US |
dc.publisher | Wiley Periodicals, Inc. | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Optimal Pricing | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Delay‐Sensitive Customers | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Queueing Delays | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Service System | en_US |
dc.title | Optimal Uniform Pricing Strategy of a Service Firm When Facing Two Classes of Customers | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.rights.robots | IndexNoFollow | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Industrial and Operations Engineering | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Engineering | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/106838/1/poms12171.pdf | |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/106838/2/poms12171-sup-0001-Onlinesupplement.pdf | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/poms.12171 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Production and Operations Management | en_US |
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dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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