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Market Good Flexibility in Capacity Auctions

dc.contributor.authorHall, Nicholas G.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Zhixinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-04-08T20:50:00Z
dc.date.available2014-05-01T14:28:26Zen_US
dc.date.issued2013-03en_US
dc.identifier.citationHall, Nicholas G.; Liu, Zhixin (2013). "Market Good Flexibility in Capacity Auctions." Production and Operations Management 22(2): 459-472. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/97251>en_US
dc.identifier.issn1059-1478en_US
dc.identifier.issn1937-5956en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/97251
dc.publisherI‐Tech Education and Publishingen_US
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.subject.otherCapacity Allocationen_US
dc.subject.otherMarket Good Flexibilityen_US
dc.subject.otherNoncooperative Gameen_US
dc.subject.otherAuctionen_US
dc.titleMarket Good Flexibility in Capacity Auctionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelIndustrial and Operations Engineeringen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelEngineeringen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/97251/1/poms1355.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/97251/2/poms1355-sup-0001-AppendixS1.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01355.xen_US
dc.identifier.sourceProduction and Operations Managementen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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