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Implementation of Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Strategic Behavior

dc.contributor.authorBlume, Lawrence E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorEasley, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-14T23:20:08Z
dc.date.available2013-11-14T23:20:08Z
dc.date.issued1984-08en_US
dc.identifier.otherMichU DeptE CenREST RSQE C60en_US
dc.identifier.otherE130en_US
dc.identifier.otherD830en_US
dc.identifier.otherD820en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100639
dc.description.abstractIn economies with uniform or perfect information, Walrasian allocations are implementable by Nash equilibria. Hurwica [1979] shows that it is possible to design a mechanism for allocating commodity bundles to agents such that, for all classical specifications of preferences, Nash equilibria are allocations that can be supported by competitive prices at the agent's initial endowments. We show that a similar result is not possible for Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) allocations.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipCenter for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paperen_US
dc.subjectNash Equilibriaen_US
dc.subjectRational Expectations Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.otherGeneral Aggregative Models: Neoclassicalen_US
dc.subject.otherSearchen_US
dc.subject.otherLearningen_US
dc.subject.otherInformation and Knowledgeen_US
dc.subject.otherCommunicationen_US
dc.subject.otherBeliefen_US
dc.subject.otherAsymmetric and Private Informationen_US
dc.titleImplementation of Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Strategic Behavioren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100639/1/ECON115.pdf
dc.owningcollnameEconomics, Department of - Working Papers Series


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