Implementation of Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Strategic Behavior
dc.contributor.author | Blume, Lawrence E. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Easley, David | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-14T23:20:08Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-14T23:20:08Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1984-08 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | MichU DeptE CenREST RSQE C60 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | E130 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D830 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D820 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100639 | |
dc.description.abstract | In economies with uniform or perfect information, Walrasian allocations are implementable by Nash equilibria. Hurwica [1979] shows that it is possible to design a mechanism for allocating commodity bundles to agents such that, for all classical specifications of preferences, Nash equilibria are allocations that can be supported by competitive prices at the agent's initial endowments. We show that a similar result is not possible for Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) allocations. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion Paper | en_US |
dc.subject | Nash Equilibria | en_US |
dc.subject | Rational Expectations Equilibrium | en_US |
dc.subject.other | General Aggregative Models: Neoclassical | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Search | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Learning | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Information and Knowledge | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Communication | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Belief | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Asymmetric and Private Information | en_US |
dc.title | Implementation of Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Strategic Behavior | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100639/1/ECON115.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series |
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Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series
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