Implementation of Walrasian Expectations Equilibria
dc.contributor.author | Blume, Lawrence E. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Easley, David | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-14T23:20:08Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-14T23:20:08Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1985-12 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | MichU DeptE CenREST W87-8 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D510 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D820 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100640 | |
dc.description.abstract | In an exchange economy with differentially informed traders, Non-exclusivity of information (NEI) is the condition that each trader's private information be perfectly predictable by an outside observer who has observed the private information of all other traders. NEI is one of a set of conditions which, taken together, are sufficient for the implementability of fully revealing expectations equilibria. Here we show that this condition is in fact necessary for the weak implementation of a much broader class of Walrasian equilibria, herein called expectations equilibria. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | CREST Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject | Non-exclusivity of Information (NEI) | en_US |
dc.subject | Expectations Equilibria | en_US |
dc.subject | Walrasian Equilibria | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Exchange and Production Economies | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Asymmetric and Private Information | en_US |
dc.title | Implementation of Walrasian Expectations Equilibria | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100640/1/ECON116.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series |
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Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series
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