Successful Takeovers without Exclusion
dc.contributor.author | Bagnoli, Mark | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Lipman, Barton L. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-14T23:21:06Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-14T23:21:06Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1987-08 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | MichU DeptE CenREST W87-13 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | G340 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100765 | |
dc.description.abstract | While most takeover models assume atomistic stock-holders, we analyze a single-raider model with finitely many stockholders. Because the raider can always make some stockholders pivotal, he can overcome the free-rider problem identified by Grossman and Hart (1980) and others in atomistics-stockholder models and profitably take over even without exclusion. One might expect that it would be harder for the raider to make stockholders of more widely held firms pivotal and that exclusion would thus become necessary; however, the infinite-stockholder game cannot yield this conclusion. We also consider the limit of the finite-stockholder game and give conditions under which exclusion is unnecessary. Finally, we show that exclusion leads to the possibility of inefficient takeovers. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | CREST Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject | Free-rider Problem | en_US |
dc.subject | Atomistic Stock-holders | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Mergers | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Acquisitions | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Restructuring | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Voting | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Proxy Contests | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Corporate Governance | en_US |
dc.title | Successful Takeovers without Exclusion | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100765/1/ECON022.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series |
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