Selection institutions and war aims
Smith, Alastair; Siverson, Randolph M.; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Morrow, James D.
2006-01
Citation
Morrow, James D.; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Siverson, Randolph M.; Smith, Alastair; (2006). "Selection institutions and war aims." Economics of Governance 7(1): 31-52. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/47901>
Abstract
We explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument.Publisher
Springer-Verlag
ISSN
1435-6104 1435-8131
Other DOIs
Types
Article
Metadata
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