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Selection institutions and war aims

dc.contributor.authorSmith, Alastairen_US
dc.contributor.authorSiverson, Randolph M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBueno de Mesquita, Bruceen_US
dc.contributor.authorMorrow, James D.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-11T19:31:53Z
dc.date.available2006-09-11T19:31:53Z
dc.date.issued2006-01en_US
dc.identifier.citationMorrow, James D.; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Siverson, Randolph M.; Smith, Alastair; (2006). "Selection institutions and war aims." Economics of Governance 7(1): 31-52. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/47901>en_US
dc.identifier.issn1435-6104en_US
dc.identifier.issn1435-8131en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/47901
dc.description.abstractWe explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument.en_US
dc.format.extent128231 bytes
dc.format.extent3115 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherSpringer-Verlagen_US
dc.subject.otherWar Aimsen_US
dc.subject.otherPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subject.otherPublic Finance & Economicsen_US
dc.subject.otherEconomics / Management Scienceen_US
dc.subject.otherWinning Coalitionen_US
dc.subject.otherEconomics Generalen_US
dc.subject.otherInterstate Conflicten_US
dc.subject.otherPostwar Commitment Problemen_US
dc.titleSelection institutions and war aimsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusinessen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumUniversity of Michigan, 426 Thompson St, 4203 ISR, MI 48106-1248, Ann Arbor, USAen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherDepartment of Political Science, University of California, Davis, One Shields Ave, CA 95616, Davis, USAen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherHoover Institution, CA 94305-6010, Stanford, USAen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherDepartment of Politics, New York University, 715 Broadway, 4th floor, NY 10003, USAen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampusAnn Arboren_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47901/1/10101_2005_Article_108.pdfen_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-005-0108-zen_US
dc.identifier.sourceEconomics of Governanceen_US
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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