Now showing items 1-7 of 7
Decentralized dynamic processes for finding equilibrium
(Elsevier, 1992-04)
This paper describes a class of decentralized dynamic processes designed to converge to equilibrium when the equilibrium equations are linear. These processes can also be viewed as distributed algorithms for solving systems ...
Optimal investment with derivative securities
(Springer-Verlag, 2005-10)
We consider an investor who maximizes expected exponential utility of terminal wealth, combining a static position in derivative securities with a traditional dynamic trading strategy in stocks. Our main result, obtained ...
Some fine-tuning for dominant diagonal matrices
(Elsevier, 1989-09)
Given a linear system Ax = b, where A is a dominant diagonal matrix with positive diagonals and non-positive off-diagonals, but b has both positive and negative components, necessary and sufficient conditions on bj are ...
Characterization of optima in smooth Pareto economic systems
(Elsevier, 1975)
Simple techniques of calculus and geometry are used to study and characterize the optima of pure exchange economies in which the utility functions are smooth but not necessarily convex. It is also shown how one can reduce ...
Counting Groves-Ledyard equilibria via degree theory
(Elsevier, 1983-10)
We study the Groves-Ledyard mechanism for determining optimal amounts of public goods in economies whose agents have the most general class of preferences for which a Pareto amount of public goods can be computed independently ...
Linear independence of root equations for M/G /1 type Markov chains
(Kluwer Academic Publishers; J.C. Baltzer AG, Science Publishers ; Springer Science+Business Media, 1995-09)
There is a classical technique for determining the equilibrium probabilities of M/G/1 type Markov chains. After transforming the equilibrium balance equations of the chain, one obtains an equivalent system of equations in ...
Electoral and welfare consequences of political manipulation of the economy
(Elsevier, 1985-06)
This paper examines the long-term electoral and welfare consequences of repeated strategies whereby a political office-holder induces cycles in economic variables to maximize his chances of re-election. Unlike other studies ...