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VIII—Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance

dc.contributor.authorJoyce, James M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-01T22:04:54Z
dc.date.available2010-06-01T22:04:54Z
dc.date.issued2007-08en_US
dc.identifier.citationJoyce, James M. (2007). "VIII—Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 107(1pt2): 187-206. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/75106>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0066-7374en_US
dc.identifier.issn1467-9264en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/75106
dc.format.extent169672 bytes
dc.format.extent3109 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_US
dc.rights2007 The Aristotelian Societyen_US
dc.titleVIII—Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPhilosophyen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelHumanitiesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumDepartment of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003. jjoyce@umich.eduen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/75106/1/j.1467-9264.2007.00218.x.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00218.xen_US
dc.identifier.sourceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceElga, A. forthcoming: ‘Reflection and Disagreement’, NoÛs.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGaifman, H. 1986: ‘ A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities ’, in J. Y. Halpern, ( ed. ), Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference, Monterey, California ( Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann ), pp. 275 – 92.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHall, N. 1994: ‘ Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance ’, Mind, 103, pp. 505 – 17.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHall, N. 2004: ‘ Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance ’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82, pp. 93 – 111.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKeller, J. B. 1986: ‘ The Probability of Heads ’, American Mathematical Monthly, 93 ( 3 ), pp. 191 – 7.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKelly, T. 2005: ‘ The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement ’, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1, pp. 167 – 96.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLewis, D. 1980: ‘ A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance ’, in R. C. Jeffrey, ( ed. ), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Vol. II ( Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press ); reprinted in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986 ), pp. 83 – 113. Page references in the text are to the reprint.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLewis, D. 1994: ‘ Humean Supervenience Debugged ’, Mind, 103, pp. 473 – 90.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMiller, D. 1966: ‘ A Paradox of Information ’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17, pp. 59 – 61.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceThau, M. 1994: ‘ Undermining and Admissibility ’, Mind, 103, pp. 491 – 503.en_US
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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